Gulf region is considered as an important part of the basic international security as it relates to energy security, "mainly oil”. On the Arab regional level, the truth could be absent that the Arab-Arab economic and development relations are linked and associated with these natural "oil and gas" resources, of which the Gulf Arab states have the greatest weight (specifically Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar). In addition, the geographical location of the Gulf is one of the main roads in the transportation routes and trade exchange between the different parts to this world. Moreover, the religious dimension has a cultural and historical role as the inception of Islamic religion and the forming of an Islamic center for the beginning of an Arab and Islamic world culture, and on the other side of the Gulf is the Persian Islamic face.

It is important to recognize that the security of the Gulf is a difficult equation due to the large, multiple and changing challenges and risks from time to time. The absence of joint danger in the security of the Gulf falls under the fact that each state vision, policies and risks do not apply to the others, though there was joint risk between certain countries rather than others in the Gulf from time to time. Despite the multiplicity of national security definition of a state, it can be defined clearly and precisely as the overall capacity of the state to protect its territory " basically its land and sea, and airspace", conservation of values, interests and requirements of external and internal threats, which may be directed against the political, social and economic systems as well as the territory of the State.

We will discuss three themes in this report, which is entitled "Gulf security after the nuclear deal". They are the uniformity of the danger to the security of the Gulf, Iran's regional and international role, and the third is dedicated to Gulf security perceptions after the nuclear deal.

First: The uniformity of danger to the security of the Gulf

Since the British withdrawal the risks and challenges of the security of the Gulf fall into multiple frames of relations between the eight Gulf States and Yemen as a country in the Arabian Peninsula, from the religious and ideological dimensions. Also, the conflicts and international relations at the regional level for the Middle East and at the international level took a prominent impact on security Gulf. Thus, the security of the Gulf does not have uniform risk, and we can see that in the historical and contemporary dimension regarding the diversity of strength and of the recurrence of such risks.

1. 1972-1978 Gulf security:

This period was marked by the completion of political and legal independence of the Gulf States, and they enjoyed their internal stability because of the decline of the socialist tide of Nazareth over the death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970, with the exception of Oman, which was suffering from a socialist revolution, "Dhofar Rebellion", until 1975. In this regard, there was counter support by all the Gulf States against this revolution, except by Iraq with its Arab socialist system.

Moreover, there was the land and sea border conflict between the eight countries of the Gulf, with the issue of the sustained Iranian occupation of UAE islands, and the entry of Yemen in conflicts as a border state from the countries of Arabian Peninsula. In this period, the Algiers Accord between Iran and Iraq in 1975 was concluded to end the conflict on the border between the two parties on the Shatt al-Arab, a dispute that earlier led the shah to support the Kurds in northern Iraq to destabilize Iraq, and led Iraq, in turn, to support Arabs of Ahwaz, but the then military cuff was in favor of the Shah and his strong alliance with Washington. Consequently, this agreement did not satisfy Iraq, therefore it is considered as one of the causes of the Iran-Iraq war, besides the desire to stop exporting the revolution.

As for the regional level of the Middle East, the participation in the October War in 1973, through the use of oil in the war gave evidence of the close link between the security of the Gulf and Arab security, which, in turn, impacts the global level, where US national security placed the flow of oil as the priority threat in place of combat with communism. This war has also affected the industry and, for example, it led to the appearance of small cars as a solution to reduce oil consumption. At the global level and the Cold War, all the Gulf countries were closer to the Western bloc, except Iraq. It should be noted that in this period there was an attempt to found a security agreement between the eight Gulf States, which failed in Muscat Conference in 1976.

2. Gulf Security 1979-1991:

This period was characterized by a significant overlap between the domestic, regional, international and global risks. The Iranian Shiite revolution dropped the policeman of the Gulf, "the Shah's regime," which was linked to a US strategy for the security of the Gulf through the two balanced pillars "Iran and Saudi Arabia". Then, the announcement of the Carter’s principle "Jimmy Carter, former US President" comes, which states that America «will consider any attempt by any external force to control the Gulf region an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and will repel such an attack by any means necessary, including military force ». The announcement came after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 24, 1979, and after the victory of the Iranian revolution on February 11, 1979. It is important to admit that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was a major catalyst for the emergence of Islamic militias in the Middle East region such as al Qaeda and others.

Iranian Shiite Islamic revolution was meant and continued to export themselves to the Shiite communities in the Gulf States and Iraq was more likely to be affected by that because of the high proportion of Shiites in its social consisting. After sixteen days of the Iranian revolution, Juhayman movement emerged, and it was called the Hosba (The Religious Monitoring group) was established with the view of advocacy, recognition and attention to the retroactive fundamentalist methodology which fights against heresies and evil, set off publicly from Medina. The supreme member of the retroactive Group "Nasser Alhuzaimi, offers the real story of that thought", that Juhayman movement ratified the Mahdi (savior) in its dreams, where it began as a retroactive movement (Salafi) then it misinterpreted its dreams about the Mahdi, to drop those dreams on a Hashemi man in the group, as the awaited (savior) Mahdi. And it took to theorizing events for his coming as an indication of the end of the world and the time of The Day- the same as in the theory of the return of the Prophet Jesus (peace be upon him) through the unconditional return of the Jews to the land of Palestine. This movement then occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca and was eliminated.

​Simultaneously, with the large overlap between events at the regional and international levels regarding the fall of the Shah, the emergence of the movement of Juhayman, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the beginning of the war between Iran and Iraq, the Organization of the Gulf Cooperation Council, was founded excluding Iraq and Iran. The reasons behind the failure to include Iraq were related to its socialist system that is not compatible with the other Royal countries, and also because the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia wants the role of leadership for itself. One must not overlook that, at that time, Iraq had a large Arab support as a result of signing the Camp David treaty between Egypt and Israel which cast a shadow over the security of the Gulf, and as a result of the emergence of Iraq as a seeking Arab leadership. The term that Iraq was the “eastern gate” of the Arab world dominated during the Iran-Iraq war. Because of the dispute between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath, Khomeini's Iran has to penetrate the Arab system by creating strong ties with Damascus, and Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 generated Khomeini forces support to the Lebanese informal Hezbollah "party of God".

Perhaps the occupation of Kuwait is the most dangerous event on the Gulf security, as the events of the occupation of Kuwait led the security of the Gulf to join the international coalition led by Washington to liberate Kuwait in 1991. This war, the "Desert Storm", affected on the security of the Gulf until today, because of the absence and the collapse of Iraq, the role of which was a side of the Gulf regional Triangle with Iran and Saudi Arabia in competition, conflict and cooperation. This triangle reflected the weight of these three countries, and also the preoccupation of other Gulf countries in developing their material and human capacity. In fact, this war and its consequences together with the collapse of the Soviet Union, will be an indicator for the United States to reserve its place on the pyramid of the global international system. One of the results of the war to liberate Kuwait is the start of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. By the end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, policies of containment of the Soviet Union ended, and Washington brought a new strategy (dual containment of Iraq and Iran in 1993).

3. 1992-2003 Gulf security:

With the return of border disputes between countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including but not limited to, the armed entanglement between the State of Qatar and Saudi Arabia on the border, in addition to the Iranian militancy in the occupation to islands of the UAE, the country wise perspective emerged in the Gulf region and it is a behavior of countries that expresses a large part of independence from the Arab system and the Arab originally conflicting policies. In the meantime, the Kurdish issue began to crystallize as a political independence in northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), and Iran has become powerful in Lebanon through Hezbollah "Party of God" and Syria. Simultaneously, the relationship between Iran and Hamas has developed, with the chill in Tehran's relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, especially after the second Gulf War and the opting of the Organization to negotiations as the only way to resolve the issues with Israel. At this period the siege of Iraq has dominated, coupled by the week performance and development of the Gulf Cooperation Council Organization.

On the other hand, al-Qaida took its role in prominence after the war to liberate Kuwait, and became associated with or connected to the international level through the events of 11 September 2001. Washington came carrying the banner of the war on terrorism to achieve its interests of democratization through the creation of a model by occupying and rebuilding Iraq and control its oil resources, whereas, Moscow came to Iran through the strategy of ​​reducing the dominance of Washington on the Gulf and the Middle East area. It is worth mentioning that Iran has a role in the Iraqi opposition, which has coordinated with Washington to topple the Iraqi Baath regime. Afterwards, Iran will have power in Iraq through the political Shiite dimension, which would compel Washington to deal with Iran regarding the situation in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein's Baath regime.

4. Gulf security: 2004- 2015

This period witnessed weak political alliances resulted in the axis of moderation and the axis of opposition in the Middle East, though the formation of both axis was caused by the Palestinian issue. At the time, axis of moderation tends to compromise with Israel, contrary to the axis of resistance which tends to resist against Israel and the policy of Washington in the region. However, the fact is that, the axis of resistance is an Iranian penetration of the Arab system because the axis of resistance will become Iran’s axis and excellently translating their interests after the outbreak of the Arab Spring.

This period can be reduced to the strongest security and political scene, the Arab Spring, the continuation of the Syrian revolution and Resolve Storm up to this day:

(A) The Arab Spring and the security of the Gulf:

For any political system there are inputs and outputs reflecting the political system's ability to accommodate and meet the demands of the people. Those demands must be turned by the political system into outputs, decisions and policies that serve the demands and aspirations of the people. The lack of an acceptable level of development and social and economic justice in the society inevitably leads to the fall of the political system from top to bottom thunderously as a result of a military coup or a public revolt. This is exactly what happened in the Arab Spring by the fall of some Arab republican regimes.

The Arab Spring effect was to varying degrees in the Gulf States, some of them were very much affected such as Bahrain and Oman, and some are less like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, while others like UAE and Qatar were not affected at all. Yet, the situation in Iraq and Iran was different because Iraq is suffering from the Iranian influence and a sectarian conflict. Whereas, Iran was pragmatic through its support for the regime of Bashar at the expense of the Syrian people, and the continuation of imaging itself as the vulnerable state of the Shiite sect. Here we have to mention that Iran benefited from the Arab Spring through its influence on the Shiite communities in the Gulf to destabilize the security of Bahrain and other countries in a varying and less obvious and visible way. Perhaps what happened in Kuwait, when it discovered weapons that belong to the so-called Hezbollah group in Kuwait, represents a deviation from the political, social and legal system. Also, what recently happened in Bahrain, where a cache of explosives underground was discovered in a house, and a number of those arrested were linked to terrorist acts and political personalities in Iraq and Iran. This blatant interference of Iran in Bahrain's internal affairs led to the withdrawal of Bahrain Ambassador from Iran, and Bahrain also announced that the Iranian ambassador in Manama has become persona non grata.

In the course of the Arab Spring events Qatar bet on the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic currents to power, but after the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, came July 3, 2013 with the fall of the Brotherhood in Egypt from power. This revealed a conflict between both Qatar and Turkey's policies with the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) except Oman, while Saudi Arabia, the UAE bet on the alternative power for the Muslim Brotherhood.

(B) Syrian revolution and the Resolve Storm:

The Syrian Revolution can be listed within the Arab Spring and its repercussions, and it assumes serious dimensions to the security of the Gulf through the emergence of the Islamic extremist militias such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or "Da’ash" to the strong presence of the Al-Nusra Front, in juxtaposition with the Shiite militias from Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Afghanistan which are present in Syria. This revolution also offers what looks like an alliance between Moscow, Iran, the Syrian regime and the Iraqi government in addition to the non-states actors like Hezbollah. In confrontation to that revolution, Resolve Storm is blowing to curb and deter the expansion of the religious influence and strength of Tehran, which is driven by multi-religious centers in Qom in Iran to Najaf Iraq and to the Jabal Amel in Lebanon. Thus, the position of Yemen is of an infinite importance in Gulf security.

Second: Iran's regional and international role

(A) The duplicate identity and the role of Iran:

The identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran comes as a Shiite Muslim country with a Persian identity with all its historic depth and pragmatic and ambitious future. Each identity has a role which is reflected by its acts, and here the role of Iran, regionally and internationally, is a reflection of its dual identity. So, it has a role in supporting the parties, militias, groups and Shiite regimes in the Arab world which reflects its identity as a hub for Shiite governments, influence and power. This gives Iran the upper hand in Iraq, and Lebanon, through Shiite ingredients as «Hezbollah», the exploitation of «Hamas» to have a presence and role in the Palestinian issue, to Yemen across the «Houthin rebels» and to other Arab countries that have Shiite constituents such as Bahrain and Kuwait. Iran supports its allies using the massive oil and gas revenues mixed with the ideas and the principles of the Shiite sect, and what is imposed by communication and contacts centered with Iran to follow the same doctrine through Shiite influence across countries. It also adopts the idea of ​​expanding the theocratic Shiite power in the Middle East through the creation of Shiite communities and gatherings that revolve around Tehran and the Iranian city of Qom.

As for the role and behavior of Tehran to achieve their interests in international relations outside the Arab region, is reflected across the Persian identity in opposing the emergence of any force in the Arab countries that can compete with the presence of Iran in the Gulf and the Middle East. Absolutely, Iran is like Israel and somewhat like Turkey, in dealing with the Arab regional system, because they are constantly trying to reduce the emergence of any Arab force in the Middle East. Iran and Israel are not in ideological conflict, as may be imagined by many, but in a solvable strategic conflict because the two countries tend to present themselves in the Middle East that they are superior to the Arabs. Iran believes that the Arabs are inferior to them from a cultural and historical perspective, and they consider that the Persian presence at the outskirts of their territory helped in enriching their culture and civil life, or otherwise, they would not have any mention in the world. On the other hand, Israel sees itself as more powerful than the Arab countries and it fears them only because of the presence of the rights and the geography of the Arab states regarding the Israeli issue. However, Tehran and Moscow have a linked role regarding their policies in the Middle East, which reflects on the conflicts of Russia with the West.

(B) The current Gulf Iranian relations:

Conflict is prevailing in the Iran-GCC relations through Shiite cross-country sect and interference in the internal affairs and security of the Gulf States and Yemen, such as “the last incident in Bahrain, which led to the withdrawal of the ambassador of Bahrain and also the statement that the Iranian ambassador in Manama has become persona non grata". In addition, there is the conflict over the marine border with their resources, the occupation of UAE islands, the continuing of Resolve Storm, and the intervention and control of Iran in Syria through multiple Shiite militias from Iraq, Iran, Lebanon and Afghanistan together with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Despite all this, Iran is considered an important source of gas to Kuwait, Oman and others, while Qatari gas supplies to Kuwait are hampered (because Saudi Arabia refused their flow through its territory). The agricultural products of Iran and Handicrafts such as the common Islamic- GCC clothing, carpets, home tools, in addition to some other industries are flowing into the Gulf States. Iran has distinguished political relations with Oman since the days of the Shah and his cooperation in defeating the Revolution of Dhofar. Moreover, they side by side share the Strait of Hormuz and Muscat would like to play a significant role through its relations with Iran, which allows them to play a larger regional and international role. Oman has less economic resources than the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar or Iraq, which would enable it to build military capabilities or political influence. In addition, Oman will perhaps become a non-oil country like Bahrain after ten years.

As for the trade relations, UAE-Iranian relations reflect that the UAE is carrying a path of cooperation and conflict with Iran, which is a model of international relations that gives priority to the hypothesis that the conflict does not eliminate cooperation. Many Western and Gulf states are seeking market and industrial and economic cooperation with Iran after the nuclear deal.

Here remains the question of whether trade relations with their geographical and historical dimensions between Gulf Arab states and Iran ease the rings conflict? In this regard, the Gulf Arab states have to take into account the identity of money and investment in their countries and sectors. Does that identity reflect the Shiite Persian and Arab face, and whether that face is subject to sectarian political orientations? This Identity of money may affect some of the decisions and relations with Iran at the expense of Security? At the same time the Gulf States must take caution of the existence of demographic change in their countries as in Bahrain and Kuwait which reflects sectarianism, or schemes to ignite strife.

Iran wrongly believes that its trade relations with the Gulf States, exclusive of Saudi Arabia, and its excellent political and security relations with Oman would challenge the Saudi presence. Tehran does not recognize the economic level in the Riyadh presence in their relationship, but only the political level controls the future and the development of relations between them. There are conflicts between the two sides, "the Saudi and Iranian" stemming from their ambition in the code or the leadership of the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia is advantaged by being an Arab Islamic state embracing Islamic sanctities and Muslims Quibla (prayer direction), which makes it closer to the Arab countries in terms of the general premises of Arabism and history. The evidence of this conflict is what is raised by Tehran concerning the recent incidents of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, such as the fall of the crane and the stampede of pilgrims, which resulted in leaving victims behind. Tehran wants to question the Saudi Arabia capabilities in the preservation and maintenance of the Holy Places and aims to intervene in the holy sites through the creation of an international supervision policy. This is a Western and American idea in the aim to fragment the Arab region. Surprisingly, isn’t it more liable that Tehran should go to cleanse the holy city of Qom from the prostitution and drugs where the Muslim women rights are violated in Qom through fatwas that are not related to religion? It is also "the city" to bring up the religious Shiite doctrine men of the future! What a leadership will emerge?

Third: perceptions of the Iranian role in Gulf security after the nuclear deal

The major powers Group 5 +1 "permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany" have announced that they reached a final agreement with Iran on its nuclear program. The text of the agreement openly states lifting the international sanctions on Iran in exchange for restriction and control of Iran’s nuclear program in order not to develop nuclear military aspects.

It is a fact that agreement on Iran's nuclear program represents an access to an acceptable conflict management and the interests between both Washington and the West with Tehran since the Islamic revolution in Iran. It also reflects the failure of both sides “Iran and the United States" on the approach and method followed by them during the past three decades. Iran accepted the harsh conditions stipulated by the agreement because of its inability to continue to bear the costs of the economic and banking sanctions imposed by Obama and the European Union Administration since 2012, and this does not prevent Iran from the ideological and religious slogans it launched as they are good at pragmatic language in international relations. As for The United States of America, the agreement represents a recognition that the policy of containing Iran and the siege has failed to achieve its objectives, especially after the occupation of Iraq in 2003. Iraq fell, however, under the Iranian influence, and Washington failed to resolve the crisis in Syria and Yemen, allowing Iran to extend its influence in these two countries. Washington, led by the Democratic Party, would prefer to use diplomatic force and binding agreements over the economic and military confrontations, and this is what happened in the change of its relations with Cuba. The Nuclear Agreement between Iran and the Group of 5 +1 carries political, security, economic and ideological perceptions on the security of the Gulf, and the role of Iran in the Middle East. Here we pose several scenarios which help to draw a picture of the future Gulf security.

Scenario I: Iran as a destabilizing security factor in the Gulf:

This nuclear deal with Iran is a gain for the legitimacy and the survival of the theocratic regime of the mullahs "religious order", economic and political gain, which in turn will increase the intervention and control of Iran in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and other Shiite communities in the Gulf region "such as Bahrain and Kuwait," and other Arab and Islamic countries. In addition, it is awaited to what will result in the case of Yemen in "Resolve Storm", which in turn may lead to a large sectarian conflict that will surpass the Arab and Islamic region; a conflict that will not be only between the Islamic militia, but also between religious and cultural frameworks, which will be reflected on the citizenship and the internal security of the states, and submission to religious affiliation. As for the marine natural resources, Iran is a country with a long coastal line on the Gulf with an imbalance of power in their favor with the rest of the Gulf States, which will lead inevitably to ignite maritime border disputes. Robbery encroachment by force is likely to happen by the Iranians on those marine resources to get the largest share of them. For example, inclusively, the dispute over the Dorra offshore field recently has raised Kuwait’s protest against Tehran’s sudden declaration to put forward two projects to develop the Dorra field along in front of foreign companies, ignoring the rejection of the Kuwaiti firm for any development in the field projects, before the demarcation of the continental shelf. It is noteworthy that "Dorra field" is also shared by Saudi Arabia. Another example is Tehran’s complains that Qatar takes a greater share of the North gas field than its own.

This perception leads to two possibilities:

First: some Gulf countries will seek to create a military and political alliance themselves or with the participation of other Arab countries, to possess and build up quality military capacities to deter the uniqueness of the Iranian military and ideological power in the Gulf and the Middle East as a part of the premises to create a balance of power in the Gulf . The historical dimension of the so-called Triangle of the Gulf, offers a vision of what the Gulf region should be. This triangle was composed of Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia and its period reflected the existence of some semi-balance of power, though inclined to the Iranian side until the collapse of the shah's regime. During the Iraq-Iran war Iran's theocratic regime managed to maintain its military and political strength against not only the Gulf, but also the Arab system as a whole. It has penetrated the regional Arab system relations with Syria and Lebanon through Hezbollah, and after the destruction of the Iraqi force in Kuwait liberation in 1991, and then the fall of Iraq under the Iranian influence since 2003. Considering the Arab Spring events and the decline of the American role in Gulf security in favor of Iran, the Gulf region has become in an urgent need to form an alliance led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE with important Arab countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Yemen, or non-Arab countries like Pakistan and Turkey. This coalition is supposed to be an Arab Gulf coalition against Iran, and must come out with military, political and even cultural frameworks.

Second: the assumption of a balance of power in the Gulf does not deter Iran only, but also possibly creates security understandings to be reached by the Arab Gulf states and Yemen with Iran about the security of the Gulf under the auspices of US and Russian pressure. It is a shaky probability from the realistic perspective due to the lack of balance and deterrence between Iran and any state/Gulf states at the present time and there are no strong signs of that, with the lack of US/Russian understanding about international issues, considering the dispute between them about the Ukrainian crisis, and the expansion of NATO and Western liberality and its colliding with the security of Russia.

Scenario II: Iran as a factor of stability in the Gulf and the Middle East:

This perception comes out of the US policy toward Iran which has changed from containment to participation. Containment of Iran is a strategy that emerged in 1993, and it also included Iraq and is no longer effective. After the nuclear deal, Iran moves from containment to participation in the stability of the Gulf region and the Middle East. This is based on the fact that the regional policy of Iran is a factor of instability in the Gulf and the Middle East, as Tehran provides big political, military and financial support to its allies and agents in Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and other Arab and Islamic countries. This means that the cause of instability and chaos in the Middle East also has the ability to create stability. But this perception, "Iran's participation in the region's stability" also carries a conflict. It is understood by this strategy of Washington a recognition of Iran's presence and regional strength, which leads to regional domination through which the imposition of interests and the Iranian targets are pragmatic at the expense of the interests of other countries, even if it happens after a period of time. In this regard, there are Gulf and Arab countries, as well as Turkey and Israel, which will seek to reduce the growing Iranian regional power and the presence, including the fact that these countries may cooperate with each other against it.

Scenario III: Iran retains its policy under Western restrictions for a long time:

Iran continues to develop its military and industrial capabilities with the opening up of international relations, besides its power through its allies and agents of states and non-states in the Middle East, despite the reduction of the proportion of uranium enrichment agreement imposed on it through the nuclear limitation.

This perception probably poses itself through certain paths and transformations in the Gulf region:

1. The Gulf region remains free of nuclear military capabilities, while allowing the exploitation of peaceful nuclear energy for all the Gulf states, and Iran will dramatically evolve to become a country with industrial, economic, military, regional and international weight.

2. Recognition of the need for Iran and Gulf Arab states including Yemen and other Arab and Islamic countries to sign agreements about respecting the sovereignty of nations, ending episodes of sectarian Shiite-Sunni conflict, similar to the Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648 to end the wars and conflicts in Europe. This is an attempt to create the foundations and principles of international relations based on the basic axes that should not be neutralized in the agreement: a) the independence of the states so that the right of the state to exercise its policy in its territory, without foreign interference whether it stems from religious authority or from a neighboring country which means submission to the national state. B) Adoption of the principle of equality of Independent States. C) Recognition of the difference of political systems between the Republic and a kingdom or with a particular religious doctrine. Westphalia treaty, which put the international balance in Europe, must be the basis for keeping peace and cooperation against any state trying to expand. As such, "Treaty of Westphalia" has become the most important foundation to the establishment of international law and international relations.

By

Humaid Al Mansouri

Writer and political analyst

October,2015